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Abstract 
This study analytically investigates the choice of a cost accounting system based on the cost-based transfer 
price by a divisionalized firm that has a direct channel through electronic commerce (EC). The findings 
show that the optimal choice between direct and absorption costing affects the increase of overhead 
allocation for the retail division through the cost-based transfer price. While traditional strategic transfer 
pricing literature shows that absorption costing is optimal in specific economic environments, this study 
demonstrates that direct costing is also optimal in a specific economic environment by considering dual 
channel competition. This research thus contributes to the extant strategic transfer pricing literature, which 
considers the choice of a cost accounting system in management accounting. 
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Ⅰ INTRODUCTION1 
The significance of transfer prices in operational decisions has increased because large firms, such 
as multinationals, comprise multiple divisions. For example, General Motors Company and Panasonic use 
transfer prices to optimize the profits of their divisional operations. Additionally, a multinational enterprise 
(e.g., Starbucks Corporation) can use transfer pricing to avoid profit taxes. To counter such tax avoidance, 
the OECD provides a guideline for multinational transfer pricing. Hence, the transfer price is an essential 
factor to be considered in contemporary management accounting practice. 
Management accounting research analyzes optimal internal transfer prices. The economic analysis 
of transfer pricing under price competition from a managerial viewpoint dates to Hirshleifer (1956), who 
argues that an internal transfer price equal to the marginal cost alleviates any double marginalization 
problems. Following Hirshleifer (1956), other studies in management accounting analyze the optimal 
transfer price using market competition models (e.g., Alles and Datar, 1998; Arya and Mittendorf, 2007; 
Autrey and Bova, 2012; Fjell and Foros, 2008; Göx, 2000; Hamamura, 2018; Matsui, 2011, 2012, 2013; 
Narayanan and Smith, 2000; Schjelderup and Sørgard, 1997; Shor and Chen, 2009). Most of these studies 
examine optimal transfer pricing by comparing marginal costs and discussing cost-based transfer pricing 
(e.g., Alles and Datar, 1998; Göx, 2000; Matsui, 2011, 2012). 
Tang (1992) provides an important empirical contribution to the literature on transfer pricing by 
examining the relationships between the practical transfer prices and the cost accounting system. 
Specifically, he examines 143 Fortune 500 firms and finds that 46.2% of them are cost-based. Further, 7.7% 
use variable costs of production, 53.8% use full production costs, and 38.5% use full production costs plus 
a markup. Accordingly, Tang (1992) concludes that, in practice, many firms set transfer prices by using 
absorption costing. 
                                                          
1 Abbreviations: Electronic commerce (EC), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
First-order condition (F.O.C.). 
  
Given the increased attention paid to transfer prices by both academics and business practitioners, 
this study investigates the optimal choice of a cost accounting system when the firm adopts cost-based 
transfer prices. For instance, Göx (2000) shows that the optimal unobservable internal transfer price exceeds 
the marginal cost because firms use absorption costing to determine the internal transfer price as a 
commitment device that allows them to commit to softer competition. 
Matsui (2012, 2013) demonstrates contrary results to those of Göx (2000) by considering an entry 
game or risk-averse manager. Specifically, Matsui (2012) considers that a risk-averse production division 
manager faces uncertainty on the outcomes from R&D investments, which affects fixed costs. When the 
manager is highly risk-averse, direct cost pricing becomes profitable because absorption costing is risky as 
it is affected by R&D investment. Additionally, Matsui (2013) considers the entry threat and shows that the 
incumbent credibly commits to an observable transfer price. The commitment to direct costing enables the 
incumbent to deter the entry of potential competitors.  
This study provides additional findings and implications on the choice of a cost accounting system 
to strategic transfer pricing research in management accounting based on Tang (1992), who investigates 
the choice of a cost accounting system that affects internal transfer pricing. 
The present study considers a direct channel of EC, which is not considered in prior transfer pricing 
research, in the choice of a cost accounting system. However, a direct channel by EC is frequently 
investigated in operations research or marketing, and such studies simultaneously consider the level of 
transfer price (e.g., Cattani et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2017; Dumrongsiri et al., 2008; Matsui, 2017). A direct 
channel of EC can be observed in practice. For example, Apple Inc. has channels that consist of online and 
retail stores. In the online store, consumers can buy, for example, a MacBook by using the internet, and the 
product is delivered by a delivery company. Additionally, Suntory Beverage & Food Limited, a Japanese 
company, sells beverages in both retail and online stores. Hence, in practice, there are many examples of 
the dual channels of a direct channel and a retail division or store. These examples suggest competition 
exists between the direct channel and retail division. 
  
There is an important relationship between transfer pricing and direct channel research because a 
downstream division is managed using transfer pricing when the firm is divisionalized on the existing direct 
channel. While transfer pricing and the direct channel have an important relationship, the choice of a cost 
accounting system when adopting a cost-based transfer price has not yet been considered in the literature. 
Hence, this study considers the choice of a cost accounting system between absorption and direct costing 
through a direct channel, namely EC. 
The findings show that direct costing is more profitable than absorption costing when there is a 
high overhead allocation to the retail division, contrary to Göx (2000). When the overhead allocation to the 
retail division facing absorption costing increases, the profit of the retail division decreases through the 
increase in the retail division's marginal cost. As a result, firm-wide profit decreases by decreasing the retail 
division's profit under specific conditions. However, absorption costing has a positive effect on firm-wide 
profit. When the marginal cost of the retail division increases through increasing the overhead allocation, 
the sales quantities of both channels decrease and market prices increase. This positive effect is important 
because it is a counterintuitive outcome that increasing marginal cost is profitable for firm-wide profit. An 
optimal choice between absorption or direct costing influences the effects of the increasing marginal cost, 
that is, increasing market prices and decreasing retail divisional profit.  
 
Ⅱ BASIC MODEL 
 Assume that the divisionalized firm is composed of headquarters (denoted as 𝐻) and a retail 
division (denoted as 𝑅). 𝐻 produces the final product sold on a product market and transfers the product to 
𝑅, which sells it on the market. This study assumes that products are produced at marginal cost 𝑐 (> 0), 
transferred with transfer price 𝑡 to 𝑅, and sold by 𝐻 on the same market using EC. The market price decided 
by 𝑅 is denoted 𝑝𝑅, and the market price decided by 𝐻 is 𝑝𝐻. This study also assumes competition exists 
between the direct channel and the retail division. In practice, consumers can choose the purchasing channel 
by comparing factors such as price or trip cost. The situation in this study is represented in Figure 1. 
 
  
Figure 1. Scenario analyzed in this study 
 
 
Players𝐻and 𝑅  engage in quantity competition in a product market, following prior strategic 
transfer pricing literature (e.g., Arya and Mittendorf, 2007; Autrey and Bova, 2012). This paper assumes 
the following demand function: 
    𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝜃𝑞𝑗,        (𝑖, 𝑗) = (𝑅, 𝐻), (𝐻, 𝑅).                                                                                                  (1) 
The degree of substitution between channels is denoted as 𝜃 ∈ (0,1) . When 𝜃  approaches 0, 
division 𝑖 operates a monopoly. Here, 𝑎 (> 𝑐) is a positive constant.  
This study assumes that the firm sets the cost-based internal transfer price used to transfer product 
from 𝐻 to 𝑅. When the firm uses the cost-based transfer price, it presumably chooses a cost accounting 
system under either absorption or direct costing. When the firm adopts direct costing, the cost-based transfer 
price 𝑡 is equal to 𝑐 (𝑡 = 𝑐). When the firm adopts absorption costing, the cost-based transfer price 𝑡 is 
equal to 𝑐 + 𝑟 (𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑟). Here, 𝑟 (> 0) is the overhead allocation to the retail division of the firm. Hence, 
under absorption costing, the cost-based transfer price corresponds to the marginal cost-plus the overhead 
allocation. This assumption is considered in prior studies (Matsui 2013). If I assume endogenous overhead 
allocation, it is difficult to analyze this model. Additionally, it is not important to identify the overhead 
allocation. However, the difference in outcomes between 𝑟 = 0 and 𝑟 > 0 is important here. Further, this 
  
study assumes 𝑎 > 𝑐 + 𝑟 , which is the incentive of the retail division to sell the product. This study 
compares the profit between absorption and direct costing. 
𝐻 manages firm-wide profit and 𝑅 divisional profit 𝜋𝑅 as follows: 
    Π = (𝑝𝐻 − 𝑐)𝑞𝐻 + (𝑝𝑅 − 𝑡)𝑞𝑅 + (𝑡 − 𝑐)𝑞𝑅 + 𝑉 − 𝐹,                                                                                    (2) 
    𝜋𝑅 = (𝑝𝑅 − 𝑡)𝑞𝑅 .                                                                                                                                                      (3) 
This study assumes 𝑉 > 0 is the profit from other businesses (products) of the firm and 𝐹 > 𝑟 is 
firm-wide overhead; this study assumes 𝑉 > 𝐹 to simplify the model. Additionally, for simplicity, this 
study assumes 𝑟 does not affect the level of 𝑉 (𝑑𝑉/𝑑𝑟 = 0). Section 4 relaxes this assumption and analyzes 
the impact of altering 𝑟 on 𝑉 in an additional analysis. The first term in Eq. (2) is the profit from the direct 
channel of EC, the second term is the profit of the retail division, and the third term is profit from 
transferring the product to 𝑅. This study also assumes 𝐻 maximizes Eq. (2) and 𝑅 maximizes Eq. (3). 
Moreover, from Eq. (2), the marginal cost of 𝐻 is equal to 𝑐 for the direct channel. Consequently, 
the manufacturing cost of 𝐻 is always calculated using direct costing. While 𝑅 must commit to internal 
cost-based transfer pricing by choosing the cost accounting system, 𝐻 is not required to commit to the 
chosen cost accounting system. Hence, 𝑅  must determine the strategies corresponding to the cost 
accounting system chosen by 𝐻. However, as previously mentioned, 𝐻 is not required to commit to the cost 
accounting system, which affects the internal cost-based transfer price. 
In sum, this paper considers the following timeline. First, 𝐻 produces products at marginal cost 𝑐 
and transfers products to 𝑅. Next, 𝐻 and 𝑅 choose sales quantities for a product market. Finally, profits are 
realized. This research does not consider the endogenous choice of the cost accounting system and 
compares the profits of both cost accounting systems at equilibrium. Additionally, variables cannot change 
after the decision and can be mutually observed. 
 
  
Ⅲ ANALYSIS 
This study analyzes the model proposed in the prior section using backward induction. As 
previously mentioned, this paper considers the equilibrium in two cases - direct and absorption costing. 
 
Direct costing 
First, consider that 𝐻  chooses direct costing, 𝑡 = 𝑐 . 𝐻  chooses 𝑞𝐻  to maximize Eq. (2), and 𝑅 
chooses 𝑞𝑅 to maximize Eq. (3), which leads to the following F.O.C. of each player: 
    𝑎 − 𝑐 − 2𝜃𝑞𝑅 − 2𝑞𝐻 = 0,                                                                                                                                      (4) 
    𝑎 − 𝑐 − 2𝑞𝑅 − 𝜃𝑞𝐻 = 0.                                                                                                                                         (5) 
From Eqs. (4) and (5), this paper obtains the following strategies of each player: 
    𝑞𝐻
𝐷𝐶 =
(1 − 𝜃)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2 − 𝜃2
,                                                                                                                                           (6) 
    𝑞𝑅
𝐷𝐶 =
(2 − 𝜃)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2(2 − 𝜃2)
,                                                                                                                                           (7) 
where the superscript 𝐷𝐶  denotes direct costing. In this outcome, 𝑞𝐻
𝐷𝐶 < 𝑞𝑅
𝐷𝐶  holds because 𝐻  selects 
strategies to maximize firm-wide profit, which includes the profit of 𝑅. In practice, the EC direct channel 
quantity is smaller than that of the retail channel. Hence, this outcome is consistent with management 
accounting practice in the real world. 
Additionally, the firm-wide profit is as follows: 
    Π𝐷𝐶 =
(8 − 8𝜃 − 𝜃2 + 2𝜃3)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
4(2 − 𝜃2)2
+ 𝑉 − 𝐹.                                                                                               (8) 
Because this outcome corresponds to a well-known result regarding the dual channel of a direct 
channel and a retailer, it is not a unique outcome of this paper. Thus, this study compares this outcome with 
the outcome of the next subsection. 
 
  
Absorption costing 
Next, consider that 𝐻  chooses absorption costing 𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑟 . The difference between the best 
response function of this subsection and that of the prior section is the overhead allocation, 𝑟. Hence, the 
following best response function of 𝑅 is as follows: 
    𝑎 − (𝑐 + 𝑟) − 2𝑞𝑅 − 𝜃𝑞𝐻 = 0.                                                                                                                             (9) 
While the best response function of 𝑅 is as described above, the best response function of 𝐻 is 
similar to Eq. (4). This is because this paper adopts the cost-based transfer price, which is affected by the 
cost accounting system, while the transfer price through the cost accounting system does not apply in 
calculating 𝐻's performance. While it seems that the third term of Eq. (2) may affect the performance of 𝐻, 
𝑞𝐻, which is decided by 𝐻, does not affect 𝐻’s performance. Hence, upon identifying the F.O.C. of 𝐻, there 
is no difference between the best response function of 𝐻 in the prior subsection and that in this subsection. 
Therefore, the best response function of 𝐻 corresponds to Eq. (4). From the best response functions, I 
identify the optimal strategies as follows: 
    𝑞𝐻
𝐴𝐶 =
(1 − 𝜃)(𝑎 − 𝑐) + 𝑟𝜃
2 − 𝜃2
,                                                                                                                              (10) 
    𝑞𝑅
𝐴𝐶 =
(2 − 𝜃)(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 2𝑟
2(2 − 𝜃2)
,                                                                                                                              (11) 
where superscript 𝐴𝐶 denotes absorption costing. 
In addition, the firm-wide profit is as follows: 
    Π𝐴𝐶 =
(8 − 8𝜃 − 𝜃2 + 2𝜃3)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 + 4𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)
4(2 − 𝜃2)2
+ 𝑉 − 𝐹.                        (12) 
Following proposition summarizes the outcome of absorption costing: 
 
 
  
Proposition 1. When the firm adopts a direct channel by EC, optimal strategies and firm wide-profit are as 
follows: 
𝑞𝐻
𝐴𝐶 =
(1 − 𝜃)(𝑎 − 𝑐) + 𝑟𝜃
2 − 𝜃2
, 
𝑞𝑅
𝐴𝐶 =
(2 − 𝜃)(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 2𝑟
2(2 − 𝜃2)
, 
Π𝐴𝐶 =
(8 − 8𝜃 − 𝜃2 + 2𝜃3)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 + 4𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)
4(2 − 𝜃2)2
+ 𝑉 − 𝐹. 
 
The next proposition considers the property of firm-wide profit at equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 2. When overhead allocation 𝑟 satisfies the following condition: 
𝑟 <
𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2(1 + 𝜃)
, 
firm-wide profit 𝛱𝐴𝐶 increases by increasing 𝑟. 
 
Proof. Consider the first derivative of firm-wide profit with respect to 𝑟 to obtain following result: 
   
∂Π𝐴𝐶
∂r
=
4(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 2𝑟(1 + 𝜃))
4(2 − 𝜃2)2
.                                                                                                     (13) 
Equation (13) is positive when 
    𝑟 <
𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2(1 + 𝜃)
,                                                                                                                                                         (14) 
holds. In this case, the firm-wide profit increases by increasing the overhead allocation 𝑟. (Q.E.D.) 
 
From Proposition 2, when 𝑟  is small, the firm-wide profit increases by increasing 𝑟 . When 𝐻 
chooses absorption costing, the cost-based transfer price increases the marginal cost of 𝑅  as the firm 
  
engages in softer competition in a product market compared to direct costing. This increases firm-wide 
profit. However, the cost of 𝑅 increases and 𝑅's profit decreases by increasing 𝑟 under absorption costing. 
As a result, Proposition 2 is obtained when the impact of engaging in softer competition exceeds the impact 
of decreasing 𝑅's profit. This result is counterintuitive. 
When the direct channel is EC, the increase in the retail division's costs is not necessarily affected. 
The practical implication is that it is necessary to successfully control market prices through sales quantities. 
Hence, companies will need to concentrate on subsequent decisions without being hampered by the 
increasing costs. 
 
Absorption versus direct costing 
Next, this study compares the strategies and firm-wide profit between absorption and direct costing, 
rewriting Eqs. (10), (11), and (12) as follows: 
    𝑞𝐻
𝐴𝐶 =
(1 − 𝜃)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2 − 𝜃2
+
𝑟𝜃
2 − 𝜃2
,                                                                                                                      (15) 
    𝑞𝑅
𝐴𝐶 =
(2 − 𝜃)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2(2 − 𝜃2)
−
𝑟
2 − 𝜃2
,                                                                                                                      (16) 
    Π𝐴𝐶 =
(8 − 8𝜃 − 𝜃2 + 2𝜃3)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
4(2 − 𝜃2)2
+ 𝑉 − 𝐹 +
𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)
(2 − 𝜃2)2
.                           (17) 
The results can be represented as follows: 
    𝑞𝐻
𝐴𝐶 = 𝑞𝐻
𝐷𝐶 +
𝑟𝜃
2 − 𝜃2
,                                                                                                                                            (18) 
    𝑞𝑅
𝐴𝐶 = 𝑞𝑅
𝐷𝐶 −
𝑟
2 − 𝜃2
,                                                                                                                                            (19) 
    Π𝐴𝐶 = Π𝐷𝐶 + 𝑉 − 𝐹 +
𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)
(2 − 𝜃2)2
.                                                                           (20) 
From Eq. (18), 𝑞𝐻
𝐴𝐶 > 𝑞𝐻
𝐷𝐶 is obvious, as is 𝑞𝑅
𝐴𝐶 < 𝑞𝑅
𝐷𝐶 from Eq. (19). When 𝐻 adopts absorption 
costing, the cost-based transfer price is higher than when direct costing is adopted. In this model, because 
  
𝐻 and 𝑅 face quantity competition on a product market, 𝐻 can supply a larger quantity by decreasing 𝑅's 
quantity and can prevent a collapse from an excess supply.  
Next, this study considers firm-wide profit. From Eq. (20), firm-wide profit with absorption costing 
is equal to firm-wide profit with direct costing plus 𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)/(2 − 𝜃2 )2 . The 
relationship between firm-wide profit and absorption and direct costing is thus affected by the sign of 𝑟(1 −
𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)/(2 − 𝜃2 )2. When this term is positive, firm-wide profit exceeds the profit with 
direct costing and does not exceed the profit with direct costing when this term is negative. The following 
proposition summarizes this outcome: 
 
Proposition 3. Firm-wide profit with direct costing exceeds profit with absorption costing when 𝑟 >
𝜃 (𝑎 − 𝑐)/(1 + 𝜃) holds. 
 
Proof. Proposition 3 is obtained by considering the condition of 𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)/
(2 − 𝜃2)2 < 0. (Q.E.D.) 
 
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal choice of a cost accounting system is affected by the economic 
environment. When overhead allocation 𝑟 is small, firm-wide profit is increased with absorption costing. 
This is because absorption costing has a positive effect on firm-wide profit, as shown in Proposition 2, and 
a negative effect on the profit of 𝑅 through the cost-based transfer price. The trade-off between both effects 
depends on the optimality of the cost accounting system. When 𝑟 is large, the negative effect exceeds the 
positive effect of absorption costing, and direct costing is the optimal choice of 𝐻 in this case. 
This study defines ?̃? ≡ 𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐)/(1 + 𝜃) to consider the threshold of overhead allocation 𝑟 in 
Proposition 3. It is intuitive that threshold ?̃? is increasing in 𝑎 and decreasing in 𝑐 because increasing the 
intercept of the demand function positively affects profit and increasing the marginal production cost 
  
negatively affects profit. Additionally, differentiating the threshold with respect to 𝜃 yields the impact of 
increasing 𝜃: 
    
∂?̃?
∂θ
=
𝑎 − 𝑐
(1 + 𝜃)2
> 0.                                                                                                                                               (21) 
Therefore, increasing the degree of product differentiation 𝜃  decreases threshold ?̃? . When ?̃? 
increases, the condition where firm-wide profit with direct costing is larger than with absorption costing 
becomes less important. Hence, the benefit of the price increasing with adopting absorption costing 
increases. Consequently, the following proposition is obtained: 
 
Proposition 4. The threshold ?̃? increases when 
𝜕?̃?
𝜕𝜃
=
𝑎 − 𝑐
(1 + 𝜃)2
> 0, 
holds. 
 
Proposition 4 shows that 𝑟  increases due to more intense competition in specific economic 
environments. When competition becomes intense, tacit collusion using absorption costing is effective 
because 𝐻 and 𝑅 obtain lower profits under intense quantity competition with cannibalism. In this situation, 
when 𝐻 adopts absorption costing and increases the marginal cost of 𝑅, 𝐻and 𝑅 need not engage in intense 
competition by overproduction because they can face softer competition as the marginal cost of 𝑅 increases. 
Hence, is difficult to consider direct costing as an advantage by increasing the degree of product 
differentiation, 𝜃. 
The outcome shows that the degree of overhead allocation 𝑟 has a significant impact on the choice 
of a cost accounting system. Prior research, such as Göx (2000) and Matsui (2013), does not analyze the 
direct channel and choice of cost-based transfer price. 
 
  
Numerical example 
Here, we consider a numerical example of the main model analysis to demonstrate the effect of 
increasing the overhead allocation 𝑟. We consider the situation when (𝑎, 𝑐, 𝜃, 𝐹, 𝑉) = (1, 0.5, 0.5, 10, 15) 
holds. The combination of exogenous variables in this example satisfies 𝑎 > 𝑐 + 𝑟, 0 < 𝜃 < 1, and 𝐹 < 𝑉. 
We represent the outcome of optimal strategies and firm-wide profit by increasing overhead allocation 𝑟 in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Optimal strategies by increasing 𝑟, when (𝑎, 𝑐, 𝜃, 𝐹, 𝑉) = (1, 0.5, 0.5, 10, 15) 
Cost accounting 𝑟 𝛱𝐷𝐶 𝛱𝐴𝐶 𝑞𝐻
𝐷𝐶 𝑞𝑅
𝐷𝐶 𝑞𝐻
𝐴𝐶 𝑞𝑅
𝐴𝐶 
 
Absorption costing 
0.05  
 
5.0816 
5.0831  
 
0.1429 
 
 
0.2143 
0.1571 0.1857 
0.1 5.0833 0.1714 0.1571 
0.15 5.8022 0.1857 0.1286 
 
Direct costing 
0.2 5.08 0.2 0.1 
0.25 5.0765 0.2143 0.0714 
0.3 5.0718 0.2286 0.0429 
We round to the fifth decimal place or less. 
 
When 𝑟 increases by 0.05 from 0.05, 𝛱𝐴𝐶 changes by increasing 𝑟, while 𝛱𝐷𝐶 does not change. 
This is because Eq. (8) is not affected by 𝑟, while Eq. (12) is affected by 𝑟. Now, considering the change in 
𝛱𝐴𝐶, when 𝑟 changes to 0.1 from 0.05 (𝑟 is sufficiently small), 𝛱𝐴𝐶 increases by increasing 𝑟. This fact is 
consistent with the outcome of Proposition 2. After that, 𝛱𝐴𝐶  decreases by increasing 𝑟. Finally, when 
𝛱𝐴𝐶 < 𝛱𝐷𝐶 holds, direct costing is superior to absorption costing. This is shown in Figure 2. 
In addition, while 𝑞𝐻
𝐷𝐶 is always smaller than 𝑞𝑅
𝐷𝐶, 𝑞𝐻
𝐴𝐶 is smaller than 𝑞𝑅
𝐴𝐶 only when 𝑟 = 0.05. 
When 𝑟 > 0.05, 𝑞𝐻
𝐴𝐶 > 𝑞𝑅
𝐴𝐶  always holds. When the firm chooses direct costing, the 𝐻 that maximizes 
firm-wide profit chooses a low quantity to engage softer competition in a product market. When the firm 
chooses absorption costing, 𝐻 tries to improve firm-wide profit by increasing the quantity sold on the direct 
channel of EC because the retail division’s profit decreases by increasing overhead allocation 𝑟. As a result, 
the quantity sold by 𝐻 exceeds that of 𝑅. 
 
  
Figure 2. Relationship between 𝛱𝐷𝐶 and 𝛱𝐴𝐶 by increasing 𝑟 
 
 
 
Ⅳ Additional analysis 
 
Relaxing the assumption of 𝑽 
Here, this study expands the basic model using the assumption of 𝑉. While this paper assumes that 
𝑉 does not change by altering 𝑟 in the basic model, this subsection considers how altering 𝑟 impacts profit 
from another product, 𝑉. When the overhead allocation for 𝑅 increases, overhead allocations for other 
divisions decrease. Hence, other divisions’ marginal costs will decrease, and their total profit will increase. 
Therefore, this paper assumes 𝑑𝑉/𝑑𝑟 > 0. 
It is important that the profits from producing V differ between absorption and direct costing. This 
is because overhead allocation for 𝑅 increases with absorption costing, compared with direct costing. Profit 
from other production with absorption costing is denoted as 𝑉𝐴𝐶 and with direct costing as 𝑉𝐷𝐶. From the 
assumption of 𝑑𝑉/𝑑𝑟 > 0, it is obvious that 𝑉𝐴𝐶 > 𝑉𝐷𝐶  (> 𝐹). 
From this assumption, this study rewrites Eqs. (12) and (8) as follows: 
  
    Π𝐴𝐶 =
(8 − 8𝜃 − 𝜃2 + 2𝜃3)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
4(2 − 𝜃2)2
+
𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)
(2 − 𝜃2)2
+ 𝑉𝐴𝐶 − 𝐹,                        (22) 
    Π𝐷𝐶 =
(8 − 8𝜃 − 𝜃2  + 2𝜃3)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
4(2 − 𝜃2)2
+ 𝑉𝐷𝐶 − 𝐹.                                                                                       (23) 
In addition, rewrite Eq. (22) as: 
    Π𝐴𝐶 = Π𝐷𝐶 +
𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)
(2 − 𝜃2)2
+ 𝑉𝐴𝐶 − 𝑉𝐷𝐶 .                                                                    (24) 
The difference between Eqs. (20) and (24) is the additional term 𝑉𝐴𝐶 − 𝑉𝐷𝐶 in Eq. (24). Hence, the 
threshold, where the profit 𝛱𝐴𝐶 with absorption costing exceeds the profit with direct costing, is different 
between the basic model and the additional analysis. 
Consider the threshold where the profit with direct costing exceeds the profit with absorption 
costing, as follows: 
   
𝑟(1 − 𝜃)(𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 + 𝜃)𝑟)
(2 − 𝜃2)2
+ 𝑉𝐴𝐶 − 𝑉𝐷𝐶 > 0.                                                                                        (25) 
Note that the profit with direct costing exceeds the profit with absorption costing in Eq. (25) as 
follows: 
    𝑟 >
𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) − √𝜃2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 +
4(1 + 𝜃)(2 − 𝜃2)2(𝑉𝐴𝐶 − 𝑉𝐷𝐶)
1 − 𝜃
2(1 + 𝜃)
,                                                            (26) 
    𝑟 <
𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) + √𝜃2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 +
4(1 + 𝜃)(2 − 𝜃2)2(𝑉𝐴𝐶 − 𝑉𝐷𝐶)
1 − 𝜃
2(1 + 𝜃)
.                                                            (27) 
However, Eq. (26) is not binding because 𝑟 > 0. Hence, Eq. (27) is the threshold that represents 
that the profit with absorption costing is greater than the profit with direct costing. Additionally, in Eq. (27), 
I consider 𝑉𝐴𝐶 = 𝑉𝐷𝐶 = 𝑉, and this threshold is equal to 𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐)/(1 + 𝜃), which corresponds to ?̃?. This 
result is summarized in the following proposition: 
  
 
Proposition 5. Assuming increasing 𝑟 affects 𝑉, the firm-wide profit with direct costing exceeds the profit 
with absorption costing when 
𝑟 <
𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) + √𝜃2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 +
4(1 + 𝜃)(2 − 𝜃2)2(𝑉𝐴𝐶 − 𝑉𝐷𝐶)
1 − 𝜃
2(1 + 𝜃)
 
holds. 
 
This proposition shows that direct costing is efficient in a specific economic environment. This 
study defines this threshold as follows: 
    ?̂? ≡
𝜃(𝑎 − 𝑐) + √𝜃2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 +
4(1 + 𝜃)(2 − 𝜃2)2(𝑉𝐴𝐶 − 𝑉𝐷𝐶)
1 − 𝜃
2(1 + 𝜃)
,                                                            (28) 
and compares ?̃? with ?̂?. As a result, ?̃? < ?̂? from the assumption of 𝑉𝐴𝐶 > 𝑉𝐷𝐶. This is because absorption 
costing has the advantage from the additional term 𝑉𝐴𝐶 > 𝑉𝐷𝐶. While this result is intuitive, this paper 
summarizes it in the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1. When increasing 𝑟 affects 𝑉 and the firm uses cost-based transfer prices, the threshold that 
represents that firm-wide profit with direct costing that is greater than the profit with absorption costing, ?̂?, 
is larger than ?̃?. 
 
In sum, the model’s result of the effectiveness of direct costing being greater than that of absorption 
costing is robust. 
 
  
Ⅴ CONCLUSIONS 
This study shows that direct costing is optimal in specific economic environments with cost based-
transfer prices, a result different from that of Göx (2000). The optimality of the choice of a cost accounting 
system based on a cost-based transfer price with a direct channel is affected by the level of the overhead 
allocation for the retail division in the proposed model. This paper shows that this result emerges in a 
specific economic environment when the assumption of the basic model is relaxed. 
In the strategic transfer pricing literature, which considers the choice of a cost accounting system, 
a direct channel of EC is not assumed. Hence, this paper has significant implications for management 
accounting practice, as when firms decide on a cost accounting system that affects the cost-based transfer 
price, they must consider the channel. 
This study has the following limitations. First, it considers an exogenously given overhead 
allocation, while many firms endogenously choose overhead allocation between divisions in practice. 
Additionally, when a firm uses absorption costing, the marginal cost of production declines by increasing 
product quantities. However, this is difficult to solve explicitly, and Matsui (2013) considers the same 
setting as this study. Hence, the assumption of this paper, which is relative to overhead allocation, is 
observed in prior strategic transfer pricing literature. Additionally, this paper does not discuss whether the 
direct channel is optimal. In other words, it analyzes the optimality of the cost accounting system when a 
direct channel is given by headquarters. Therefore, this study does not address the choice of channel. In 
addition, this paper assumes that the firm faces a monopoly market; however, in the real world, many firms 
face competition with other firms. Hence, we can consider competition with other firms as a future 
expansion of this model. While this paper has limitations, it contributes significantly to the strategic transfer 
pricing literature, which considers the optimal choice of the cost accounting system in terms of the cost-
based transfer price. 
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